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Logan and Williams: Tidelands in South Carolina: A Study in the Law of Real Property
TIDELANDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA: A STUDY
IN THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

W. TURNER LOGAN*
RUTH WILLLMS::

INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Since the decision in Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co.
v. Georgia-CarolinaCanning Co.,' there have been some fifteen opinions of the Attorney General of South Carolina to
the general effect that lands between high and low water
marks of tidal navigable streams belong to the people of the
State in common and can be granted, if at all, only by the
General Assembly.2 Two subsequent opinions, neither of which
is digested under Navigable Waters, carry this view even
further. 3 In one, the opinion was expressed that an act which
purported to confirm the title of various individuals to certain
marshland in fact had the effect of granting such marshland,
thus violating Section 31 (f) Article III of the Constitution
of 1895.4 In the other, it was said that an act was "unconstitutional as granting to the beneficiaries certain of the marshlands which admittedly were not covered by grants from
Lords Proprietors and that it is an encroachment upon the
judiciary, whose duty it is to pass upon construction of deeds
and grants." 5
The purpose of this paper is to subject to critical analysis
every South Carolina decision bearing directly or indirectly
on the ownership and legal status of lands lying below the
high water mark of tidal navigable waters, with a view
toward suggesting a different interpretation of Cape Roiniain.
To accomplish this purpose it will be necessary to examine
incidentally a few decisions from outside South Carolina.
MARSHLAND IS VALUABLE
In cities and similar urban areas marshland is principally
valuable after it has been reclaimed for building lots; but in
*Members of the Charleston County and South Carolina Bar Associations.
1. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928).
2. See 14 WEST'S S.C. DIGEST, Navigable Waters, Key Nos. 36(1) and

S6(3).

3. 1958-59 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 646 and 647.
4. Id. at 646.
5. Id. at 647.
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rural areas it can be and is used for cattle grazing, shrimp
farming, duck hunting preserves, and in some localities, for
breeding of muskrats and other fur-bearing animals. The
Soil Conservation Service of the United States Department
of Agriculture has published a number of handbooks dealing
with marsh management in various parts of the United States
and is currently engaged in the publication of such a handbook for South Carolina. In order to do this, it has engaged
in intensive and extensive research in this state, in other parts
of the United States, and abroad. This state itself has done
extensive research in this field through the well known work
of Dr. G. Robert Lunz at the Bear's Bluff Laboratory.
At one time the phosphate deposits underlying our South
Carolina marshes were considered one of the great natural
resources of the State,6 and our reported cases show that
marshland has been used for cutting grass, 7 for the deposit of
oysters shells, 8 and for harvesting oystersY The authors
know of numerous instances, and are reliably informed that
there are many others in which landowners in the coastal
counties of South Carolina are spending large sums of money
to improve marshlands, both so that they can be used as
marsh and so that they can be reclaimed as building lots. For
this reason, the authors feel that this study is of considerably
more than mere academic interest.
MARSHLAND IS GRANTABLE
For the purpose of this study, all lands may be divided into
five classes:
I. Lands above ordinary high-water mark, sometimes
known as fast lands;
II. Lands below ordinary high-water mark in waters which
are not tidal even though they may be navigable;
6. Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 36 L.Ed. 537
(1892); Chisolm v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285 (1894); Heyward v. Farmer's
Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963 (1894); Port Royal Mining Co. v.
Hagood, 30 S.C. 519, 9 S.E. 686 (1889); State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22
S.C. 50 (1884).
7. Frampton v. Wheat, 27 S.C. 288, 3 S.E. 462 (1887); Church v.
Meeker, 34 Conn. 421 (1867).
8. Town of Port Royal v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 136 S.C. 525, 134
S.E. 497 (1926).
9. Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 497 (1926).
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III. Lands between ordinary high-water mark and ordinary
low-water mark in waters which are both tidal and navigable;
IV. Lands between ordinary high-water mark and ordinary
low-water mark, and lands below ordinary low-water mark,
in waters which are tidal but not navigable; and
V. Lands below ordinary low-water mark in waters which
are both tidal and navigable.
Lands in class II are subject to the same rights of property
as are lands in class 110 and are outside the scope of this
study.
Lands in class III and class IV are herein referred to as
"marshland" and as hereafter shown are likewise subject to
the same property rights as lands in class I.
Lands in class V are subject to private ownership only to a
limited extent. A failure to distinguish between such lands
in class V on the one hand, and lands in classes III and IV on
the other, has caused such confusion as may seem to exist in
the authorities.
So far as the authors have been able to discover there are
only two texts which undertake to set forth the property
rights in lands in classes III, IV, and V as such property
rights existed under the common law of England."
To the extent that they deal with common law property
rights in lands in classes III, IV, and V they are substantially
identical and are believed by the authors to be authoritative.
Sir Mathew Hale thus states the rules of the common law
concerning the lands which we have described as belonging
in class III:
I come now to those other parts of property which a
subject may have by prescription or usage, viz. the seashore and maritime increases; which, though we have
before stated to belong prima facie to the King, yet they
may belong to the subject in point of propriety, not only
by charter or grant, whereof there can be but little doubt,
but also by prescription or usage.
10. McCullough v. Wall, 4 Rich. 68 (S.C. 1850).
11. The earlier is DE JuRs MARis, attributed to Sir Matthew Hale, and

the other is A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS AND
IN THE SOIL AND SHoREs THEREOF, by Joseph K. Angell, usually referred
to as ANGELL ON TIwEwATEms.
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1. The shore of the sea.
There seem to be three sorts of shoars, or littora
marina, according to the various tides, viz.
(1st.) The high spring tides, which are the fluxes of
the sea at those tides that happen at the two equinoxials;
and certainly this doth not de jure communi belong to
the crown. For such spring tides many times overflow
ancient meadows and salt marshes, which yet unquestionable belong to the subject. And this is admitted of
all hands.
(2nd.) The spring tides, which happen twice every
month at full and change of the moon: and the shoar in
question is by some opinion not demoninsted by those
tides neither, but the lands overflowed with these fluxes
ordinarily belong to the subject prima facie, unless the
king hath a prescription to the contrary. And the reason
seems to be, because for the most part the lands covered
with these fluxes are dry and maniorable; for at other
tides the sea doth not cover them; and therefore touching these shoars some hold, that common right speaks
for the subject, unless there be an usage to entitle the
crown; for this is nor properly littus maris. And therefore it hath been held, that where the king makes his title
to land as littus maris, or parcella littoris marini, it is
not sufficient for him to make it appear to be overflowed at spring tides of this kind.
(3rd.) Ordinary tides, or nepe tides, which happen
between the full and change of the moon; and this is
that which is properly littus maris, sometimes called
marettum, sometimes warettum. And touching this kind
of shoar, viz. that which is covered by the ordinary flux
of the sea, is the business of our present enquiry.
1st. This may belong to a subject. The Statute of 7
Jac. cap. 18 supposeth it; for it provides, that those of
Cornwall and Devon may fetch sea-sand for the bettering
of their lands, and shall not be hindered by those that
have their lands adjoining to the sea-coast, which appears by the statute they could not formerly.
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2d. It may not only belong to a subject in gross, which
possibly may suppose a grant before time of memory, but
it may be parcel of a manor. (citations and explanations)
And the evidences to prove this fact are commonly these;
constant and usual fetching gravel and sea-weed between
the high water and low water mark, and licensing others
so to do; inclosing and imbanking against the sea, and
enjoyment of what is so inned; enjoyment of wrecks
happening upon the sand; presentment and punishment
of puprestures there in the court of a manor; and such
like.
And as it may be parcel of a manor, so it may be
parcell of a vill or parish; and the evidence for that will
be usual perambulations, common reputation, known
metes and divisions, and the like. And upon this account
the person of Sutton about 14 Car. had a verdict for the
tithes of Sutton-Marsh in Lincolnshire, upon a long and
great evidence; though it appeared, that within the time
of memory it was the meer shoar of the sea covered at
ordinary tides, and without the old sea-bank.
3rd. It may not only be parcell of a manor, but de
facto it many times is so; and perchance it is parcell
almost to all such manors as by prescription have royal
fish or wrecks of the sea within their manor. For, for
the most part, wrecks and royal fish are not, nor indeed
cannot be well left above the high-water mark, unless it
be at such extraordinary tides as overflow the land; but
these are perquisities, which happen between the highwater and low-water mark, for the sea withdrawing at
the ebb leaves the wrecks upon the shore, and also those
greater fish which come under the denomination of royal
fish. He therefore that hath wreck of the set or royal
fish by prescription infro manerium, it is a great presumption that the shoar is a part of the manor, as otherwise he could not have them.
***

Thus much shall suffice concerning the shoar or space
between the high-water and low-water mark, which may
belong to a subject and be parcell of his manor.
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The same thought is expressed by Angell in somewhat different language. In Chapter IV he says (pp. 64-66):
Shore: We next proceed to consider what is to be
understood by the shore of the sea and its arms ....
In
legal construction, it may be said to be that space of land
which is alternately covered and left dry, by the rising
and falling of the tide. Or, in other words, that space of
land which is between the high and low-water marks.
And this space as has been shewn, is prima facie public.
How high-wateris determined. The next question then
is, what is to be considered as the high-water mark; as it
is well known, that the tide rises much higher on some
occasions, and at some seasons of the year, that it usually
does.
By the
termined
stood to
extended

Roman law, it seems, high-water mark was deby the highest tides, and the shore was underinclude the land as far as the greatest wave
itself in the winter....

By the common law, as it is laid down by lord Hale
(o) and others, the soil which is overflowed by high
spring tides, or by extraordinary tides at any time, does
not properly come under the denomination of shore, and
consequently the sovereign and public right is notof that
large extent. The rule which lord Hale lays down and
which is now understood to prevail, is that the shore is
that land only which is usually overflowed by ordinary
tides.
And in Chapter VI, Angell says, (pp. 87, 96-97):
RIGHTS ACQUIRABLE IN SALT AND TIDE WATERS, AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF,
BY PRESCRIPTION AND CUSTOM AND BY GRANT
ALTHOUGH it has been made to appear, that prima
facie, the sovereign has the right of property in salt and
tide waters, and that they are also for the public use;
yet there are many maritime interest to which an exclusive right may be acquired by prescription, custom and
grant.
Not only the exclusive right of fishery in salt and tide
waters, but also the exclusive right to the shores and soil
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thereof, may be acquired by prescription and custom.
Hence, all those marine increases which were stated in
chapter V as prima facie, belonging to the sovereign
power, may become the property either of an individual,
or of a particular town or district.
That the shore and soil covered with water, may belong to a subject, appears by the charter of Alen de
Percy, to the monks of Whitby, in which the bounds of
the possessions belonging to the Abbey, included many
salt water creeks; and yet there were granted by a subject (x)
The right to the shores and soil of salt and tide waters,
may not only be acquired in gross by an individual in the
manner above-mentioned, but may also be a part and
parcel of an adjoining estate, as appears by Sir Henry
Constable's case. (y)
To prove a private ownership in these cases, the evidence according to lord Hale, is the constant and usual
practice of taking the gravel and sea weed, between the
high and low-water marks, and licensing others to do
the same; enclosing and embanking against the sea, &c.
Thus in a late case in England, (Chad. v. Tilsed, before
mentioned) (z) where the proprietors of certain lands
had without opposition, for forty years asserted and
exercised by an embankment, an exclusive right to the
soil of a bay; it was held by the court that such usage
was evidence, whence anterior usage might be presumed.
The earliest South Carolina decision is the Oak Point
Mines,- a circuit decision which was not appealed from but
was published as an appendix to Volume 22 of the S. C. Reports at the suggestion of one of the justices of the supreme
court and was cited as authoritative in the recent South Carolina case of Beaufort County v. JasperCounty . 3 It is the only
decision to which the state was a party and in which the title
to land lying between the ordinary high and the ordinary
low-water marks was expressly in issue. The defendants
claimed under a grant made in 1869 which expressly conveyed to the low-water mark. Circuit Judge Maher held that
the defendant's title was good and that the state's contention
that such land was not grantable, was wholly lacking in merit.
12. State v. South Carolina Phosphate Co., 22 S.C. 593 (1874).
13. 220 S.C. 469, 69 S.E.2d 421 (1951).
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The same point was also decided in Frampton v. Wheat,'I
which was, however, an action between private parties. This
was an action to recover two hundred acres of marsh land
adjacent to Plum Island in the Ashley River in Charleston
Harbor. The plaintiff relied on an 1826 grant for seven hundred seventy-nine acres of marsh land which included ther
land in dispute. The defendant offered no evidence but successfully moved for a non-suit on the ground that the 1826
grant was void because the underlying survey violated an act
which required grants of land on navigable waters to have a
depth four times as great as their frontage. The supreme
court held that the non-suit was erroneous, and in so doing
necessarily and expressly held that the grant of marsh land
was valid. In so holding, the court relied upon State v. Pacific
Guano Co.,15 and the Oak Point Mines.' 6
The decisions in Chamberlain v. NortheasternR. R.17 and
Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co.' 8 also recognized that lands
in class III are grantable.
The four decisions above referred to have never been overruled or modified in any respect and, as previously stated,
the decision in the Oak Point Mines was relied upon in Beaufort County v. Jasper County, which is the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. As will
hereafter be shown, the question of whether such lands are
grantable was not before the court in Cape Romain and the
unfortunate dictum in that case, to the effect that such lands.
are held in trust by the state, should not be deemed authoritative or of any weight, in view of the express contrary decisions in cases where the precise point was actively litigated.
The Oak Point Mines, State v. Pacific Guano Co., State v.
Pinckney, and Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co. all involved
titles to phosphate beds. With the decline of the phosphate
industry litigation over such titles ceased, and it is often supposed that the next case concerning marshland titles to come
before our supreme court was the Cape Romain case. In fact,.
however, there were six decisions of some pertinence between
Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co. and Cape Romain.19
14. See note 7 supra.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. See note 12 supra.
17. 41 S.C. 399, 19 S.E. 743 (1894).
18. See note 6 supra.
19. Cheves v. City Council of Charleston, 140 S.C. 423, 138 S.E. 86T
(1927) ; Haesloop v. City Council of Charleston, 123 S.C. 272, 115 S.E. 596.
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Nathans v. Steinmeyer was an action to foreclose a mortgage over certain marsh or mud flats in the western section
of Charleston, on the shores of the Ashley River, which was
covered by the daily flow of the tides. The defense was failure
of consideration, in that paramount title was in the City of
Charleston. The plaintiffs claimed under a grant made in
1675, and they contended that this grant conveyed to the lowwater mark, either by its express terms or by settled usage
under the grant. The defendants contended that the grant
extended only to the high-water mark and that title to the
land in controversy had been conveyed to the City of
20
The court
Charleston by an act of the General Assembly.
'held that since neither the state nor the city were parties to
the action, and since the defendants had not been evicted, the
defense of failure of consideration could not be raised and the
above stated contentions of the parties need not be resolved.
The interesting feature of this case is that the defendant
Steinmeyer, and his father before him, had been in possession
of this land since 1842--only six years after the act of 1836
above referred to-yet, the city had never asserted its supposed title. Furthermore, this tract was sold in 1942 for nonpayment of a street improvement assessment and was bought
by the city. In recent years, it has been largely reclaimed and
part of it is again in private ownership and is being held for
sale at an asking price reputedly in excess of $100,000.00.
The only interesting feature of Gadsden v. West Shore Inv.
Co. is that it was an action for the specific performance of a
contract to buy forty-four acres of marshland, also in the City
of Charleston. This marsh had been granted in 1744 and the
only defense was that the plaintiff's title, obtained at a tax
sale, was defective. The court sustained the plaintiff's title.
Town of Port Royal v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. involved an
action to recover possession of a parcel of land which had
been created over a course of many years by the deposit of
oyster shells from an oyster canning factory. The defendant
railroad had a spur tract over part of this land. The town
was non-suited for failure to prove title to the whole parcel
sued for, and on appeal the non-suit was affirmed without
(1923); Gadsden v. West Shore Inv. Co., 99 S.C. 172, 82 S.E. 1052 (1914);
West End Dev. Co. v. Thomas, 92 S.C. 229, 75 S.E. 450 (1912); Nathans
v. Steinmeyer, 57 S.C. 386, 35 S.E. 733 (1900).
20. 7 Stat. at Large 151 (1836).
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prejudice to the town's right to bring a new action for such
of the land as had not been occupied by the railroad as a right
of way.
So far as we can discover, this is the only South Carolina
decision involving title to reclaimed land except for those
cases discussed in this article which deal with land bordering
Charleston Harbor which was formerly marshland but which
has been filled in. In those cases the land in its unreclaimed
state had all been granted, in part to private persons and in
part to the City of Charleston, by the Act of 1836,21 but in
this case the town apparently relied only on adverse
possession.
The most important of the Charleston Harbor cases is
Ehrhardtv. City Council of Charleston,- decided many years
after Cape Romain. It is therefore appropriate to discuss Cape
Romain next.
In Cape Romain, the plaintiff sued for the possession of
some thirty-four thousand acres covered by seven separate
grants, some of which specifically referred to "marsh" or
"marshland," but only one of which specified the low-water
mark as a boundary. The defendants, under a license from
the state, were gathering oysters between the high and lowwater marks within the exterior boundaries of the plaintiff's
grants. However, they were gathering no oysters in the area
where the low-water mark was specified as the boundary.
The circuit court found as a fact that the plaintiffs had
not established title to the lands between the high and lowwater marks within the exterior boundaries of its grants. The
evidence on which the court based this holding is not reported,
but it does appear that its practical effect was to deprive the
plaintiff of most of the benefits of its grants since nearly all
the land within their exterior boundaries was covered with
water at high tide. On appeal this finding of fact was affirmed, because it "... . was a question for the circuit judge
who passed on the facts in a law case, to whom the facts were
submitted instead of submitting them to a jury.... ,,23
The plaintiff in Cape Romain also relied upon title by adverse possession, but this issue was also resolved against it as
a question of fact.
21. Ibid.

22. 215 S.C. 390, 55 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
23. 148 S.C. 428, 437 (1926).
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It is true that in Cape Romain the court says:
The title to land below high water-mark on tidal navigable streams, under the well-settled rule, is in the state,
not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in trust for
purposes (emphasis added),2-1
but it is equally true that this statement is only a dictum,
entirely unnecessary to the decision of the case, and is not
supported by any of the authorities cited by the court. The
"well-settled" rule had been that it was the land below lowwater mark in tidal navigable waters that was held in trust
by the state, and even that rule is not of invariable application, as will appear from the Charleston Harbor cases.
It is a historical fact, that the greater part of the City of
Charleston was at one time wholly or partly under water;
that is, a considerable part of the city was at one time below
low-water mark and most of the remainder was between the
low- and high-water marks. It is also a fact that there are
still some lots in Charleston which are privately owned but
which are wholly or partly below low-water mark and in the
bed of the Cooper or the Ashley River. However, the titles
to these lots have been seldom, if ever, disputed and the few
cases which mention or refer to these low-water lots do so
25
only tangentially.
In the West End case the operative facts were essentially
identical to those in the Ehrhardtcase, and as they are stated
much more fully in the Ehrhardt case, no digest of the West
End case is needed.
In the Haesloop case the facts were that in 1909 the City
Council of Charleston commenced reclamation of a very substantial area, over forty acres in extent. Part of this land
was owned by the city and part by private individuals, but
almost all of it was below high-water mark and most of it
was below low-water mark. More than two hundred lots were
formed in the reclaimed area, and the Fort Sumter Hotel
stands on one of them. The Haesloop case was an action to
restrain the city from conveying this lot to the hotel company
on the ground, among others, that such conveyance would
24. Id. at 438.

25. Ehrhardt v. City Council of Charleston, supra note 22; Cheves v.

City Council of Charleston, 140 S.C. 423, 138 S.E. 867 (1927); Haesloop
v. City Council of Charleston, 123 S.C. 272, 115 S.E. 596 (1923); West

End Dev. Co. v. Thomas, 92 S.C. 229, 75 S.E. 450 (1912).
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violate Section 31 of Article III of the Constitution of 1895,
which prohibits the donation to "private corporations or individuals" of "lands belonging to or under the control of the
state." It was held that the state's fee simple title to the lot
in question had been granted to the city by the act which incorporated Charleston, 26 and hence that it did not belong to,
and was not under the control of, the state. The conveyance
was accordingly approved.
It has already been mentioned that various private persons
owned lands in the reclaimed area which, prior to the reclamation, were entirely under water. A number of these persons
conveyed to the city a right of way for the street now known
as Murray Boulevard, but which was then in the Ashley
River. Part of the consideration for the conveyances was the
city's agreement to pave the street at no expense to the
grantors. Many years later the city undertook to levy against
these grantors and their successors in title an assessment for
paving Murray Boulevard, whereupon an action was brought
to enjoin such assessment.27 The case was tried before Judge
Milledge L. Bonham, afterwards chief justice of our supreme
court, who granted a permanent injunction. In his decree,
adopted by the supreme court as its opinion, he says that the
plaintiffs "parted with valuable property rights" 28 in consideration of the city's covenants. 29 These "valuable property
rights" consisted of the ownership of lands that were, for the
most part, wholly under water.
Ehrhardt v. City Council of Charleston was an action to
restrain the city from conveying a tract of 7.4 acres on which
the Sergeant Jasper apartment house is now located, but
which at the time of the decision was a mud flat, almost all
of which was covered by water at high tide and a considerable part of which was covered by water at all times. (The
westernmost portion of the tract was still under water as recently as 1958). The ground on which it was sought to restrain the conveyance was that the land in question had been
set aside as a common by the Provincial Assembly. 0 In sustaining the validity of the conveyance our supreme court re26. 7 Stat. at Large 1783.

27. Cheves v. City Council of Charleston, id.
28. Id. at 426.

29. Ehrhardt v. City Council of Charleston, supra note 22.
30. 7 Stat. at Large 87 (1768).
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views a number of acts, from 1783 to 1930, by which the state
has granted to the City Council of Charleston extensive areas
in the bed of the Ashley River, including much land that is
wholly submerged at all times. (Parenthetically, the city has
reclaimed and is still in the process of reclaiming, some of
this land that was originally always under water. And so far
as the writers know the marketability of the city's title to this
reclaimed land has not been questioned.)
The Ehrhardt decision is dated September 23, 1949. Not
quite seven months later, on April 18, 1950, our supreme court
decided Rice Hope Plantation v. South CGrolinm Pub. Serv.
Authority,3 1 wherein the court said:
The briefs on both sides in the case before us contain
much discussion on the subject of ownership of the land
lying between normal high water mark and low water
mark on tidal navigable streams, and as to the acquisition of title thereto by private owners. We adhere to our
opinion in the case of Cape Romain Land & Improvement
Co....,
wherein it was said: 'The title to land below
high-water mark on tidal navigable streams, under the
well-settled rule, is in the state, not for the purpose of
sale, but to be held in trust for public purposes.' But we
do not deem it necessary or proper upon this appeal to
determine under what circumstances and by what
method, if any, title might be acquired by private owners,
because any such ownership would be, in our opinion,
subject to the dominant power of the government (State
and Federal) to control and regulate navigable waters. 32
In Rice Hope the plaintiff owned lands on the Santee River
near its mouth. The defendant's Santee-Cooper project, by
diverting large quantities of water from the Santee, caused
greatly increased salinity in the lower Santee. This salt water
occasionally overflowed the plaintiff's lands, killing vegetation
and rendering the lands substantially useless for hunting and
fishing. The plaintiff claimed damages both above and below
high-water mark. The defendant moved to strike portions of
the complaint and the plantiff moved to strike parts of the
answer and to make the answer more definite and certain.
The circuit judge denied the defendant's motion and granted
31. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
32. Id. at 530.
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the plaintiff's, but on appeal his order was reversed in all
but a few respects. However, despite a long and elaborate
opinion, and despite the language hereinabove quoted, there
was no holding that the plaintiff had no title below highwater mark in tidal, navigable waters or that it had no title
to the beds of streams intersecting its property that are tidal
but not navigable. The circuit judge had, in substance, ruled
both points in favor of the plaintiff; this ruling was expressly
excepted to; the exception was agreed to by both partiesbut the point was left undecided, doubtless because it was not
directly involved in any of the motions which were under
consideration. The authors had the benefits of the transcript
of record and briefs in this suit and are therefore better able
to say what was involved than is usually the case.
Early v. South CarolinaPub. Serv. Authority, 33 an action
of the same nature as Rice Hope, resulted in a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff of over $70,000.00 which was affirmed on appeal. In the Early case, the court said that the
power of the government in the interest of navigation
... extends to the entire bed of the stream, i.e., to ordinary high water mark on either side and that whatever
private property rights or interests a riparian owner
may have within those boundaries may be taken or destroyed in the exercise of that power without obligation
on the part of the government to compensate him therefor, because they always were, and always will be, subject to the navigation servitude.3 4

This language obviously recognizes the existence of private
property rights below high-water mark even though it does
not undertake to define such rights.
Finally we come to Beaufort County v. Jasper County,35 the
most recent decision on marshland as such. Yemassee Township was detached from Beaufort County, and the issue was
whether Beaufort County would still contain five hundred
square miles as required by the Constitution of 1895. The
case was referred by consent to an eminent Columbia lawyer
as special referee, who found that five hundred square miles
would remain if marshland was included and then continued:
33. 228 S.C. 392, 90 S.E.2d 472 (1955).
34. Id. at 406.
35. See note 13 supra.
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I am of the opinion, and so hold, that the soil under
water between high and low-water mark constitutes land.
. . . It therefore follows that marsh land and inland
water likewise constitute land, the subject of state and
private ownership.3 6
Except as to inland water, the referee's report was adopted
by the supreme court as its opinion.
Thus, in this, the most recent case where the point was at
issue, the supreme court has said that "marshland (is) the
subject of . . . private ownership." When this forthright
statement is taken with the quotation from the even more
recent Early case the authors feel that they can say that the
dicta of Cape Romain and Rice Hope have been recently, if
quietly, interred.
IF MARSHLAND MAY BE GRANTED,
GRANT MAY EQUALLY BE PRESUMED
But for the dictum of Cape Romain, the authors would have
thought that the proposition above set forth was not subject
to successful question. Not only is the law so laid down by
Lord Hale and Mr. Angell, but it is equally clearly set forth
in the decisions of our own court in opinions written by judges
of the highest reputation. Thus in Riddlehoover v. Kinard,
Adm'Wr, 37 Chancellor Harper, then one of the justices of the
court of appeals, spoke as follows for a unanimous court:
I shall first consider the ground of defendant's motion,
Which respects the lapse of time or the statute of limitations. Defendants, or those under whom they claim, had
been in possession of the estate, claiming it as their own,
for more than twenty years before the filing of the bill.
... The lapse of twenty years is sufficient to raise the
presumption of a grant from the State, of the satisfaction of a bond, mortgage, or judgment, of the grant of a
franchise or the payment of a legacy, or almost any thing
else that is necessary to quite title to property.38
3 9 Chief
In Kolburn v. Hollard,
Justice Dunkin said:
But the judgment of the Court is based on other and
independent consideration. Whatever rights the plaintiff
36. Id. at 490.

37. 1 Hill's Eq. 376 (S.C. 1833).
38. Id. at 378.
39. 14 Rich. Eq. 176 (S.C. 1868).
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had on 7 December 1859, when his bill was preferred,
he enjoyed equally in March 1837, when he attained his
majority. Riddlehoover v. Kinard, . . . decided nearly
forty years since, has become one of the landmarks of the
law. It is commended to approval, as well from the authority of the distinguished jurist, who was the organ of
the court, as from the cases cited, and the wisdom and
the policy of the principles announced. . . . 'If (says
Chancellor Harper) 'there had been no will, and no administration, and defendants, without color of title, had
taken possession of the property, and kept it for so long
a time, I suppose their title would be good under the
decisions.... Administration would have been presumed,
and the defendants had acquired a title from the administrator. The lapse of twenty years is sufficient to raise
a presumption of a grant from the State, of the satisfaction of a bond, mortgage, or judgment, or the grant of a
franchise or the payment of legacy or almost anything
else that is necessary to quiet the title to property.' . . •
Again, 'It is hardly necessary to say that legal presumptions are not founded on actual belief.... Presumptions
must be sometimes made against the well known truth of
40
the fact.'
The precise point in issue came up for consideration in
Busby v. Florida & R. R.4 1 This was an action to recover
damages to the plaintiff's lands from fires which were caused
by sparks from the defendant's locomotives. The defendant
denied the plaintiff's title. The plaintiff relied upon adverse
possession for fifteen years, but there was no evidence that
the land had ever been granted by the state. However, the
plaintiff had been paying taxes on the land during the period
of his adverse possession. The circuit court denied a motion
for a non-suit, which was made on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any title in himself, and there was a
verdict and a judgment for the plaintiff. Chief Justice McIver stated:
The precise question, as we understand it, intended
to be presented by this appeal, is whether a party whose
claim rests upon an assertion of title to real estate can
establish such claim by proof of adverse possession for
40. Id. at 234.
41. 45 S.C. 312, 23 S.E. 50 (1895).
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the statutory period, without first showing that the title
to the real estate in question has passed out of the state.
In the determination of this question two inquiries are
presented: Whether adverse possession of real estate for
the statutory period confers a positive, affirmative title,
or simply operates as a bar to the claim of anyone seeking
to dispossess the person in possession. ....
The next inquiry is presented is whether it is necessary,
in order to establish a title to real estate acquired by adverse possession, to show that the title to such real estate
has passed out of the state; and, if so, whether, in this
case, there was any evidence tending to show that fact; for,
if so, then there was no error in refusing the motion for
a nonsuit, and no error in charging42the jury in accordance with the ruling on the motion.
The court held that adverse possession conferred a positive,
affirmative title, and then continued as follows:
As was said by Mr. Justice McGowan in the case of
State v. Pinckney, 'Our doctrine is that the state succeeded at the Revolution to all the rights of the British
crown, one of which, as Lord Coke tells us, was that all
lands are holden mediately or immediately of the king.
The state, with us, is the common source of title, and
retains it indefinitely; it may be, until it passes from
her in the only manner known to the law, by presumption, either express or implied, or hereafter, possibly, by
operation of the new statute of limitations.' Hence, when
one undertook to establish a title to real estate by adverse
possession, it was necessary to show that title to such
real estate had passed out of the state; the maxim,
'Nullum tempis occurit regi,' being recognized here. Now,
however, since the possession provisions of the Code
have been enacted, we see no reason why a party who
has been in adverse possession of land for the requisite
period may not acquire a title against the state. But, be
that as it may, there was no evidence in this case of adverse possession by the plaintiff for a period of twenty
years-sufficiently long to bar an action by the state,as the evidence only shows a possession for fifteen years.
42. Id. at 314.
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We must therefore inquire whether there was any other
evidence tending to show that the state had parted with
title to the land claimed by plaintiff; for, if there was
any evidence tending to show that fact, that would under,
the well-settled rule, not justify, but require, a refusal of
the motion for a nonsuit. Now, the fact that the plaintiff
had been paying taxes on the land for a number of years,
as appears by the amendment made to the case at the
hearing by consent, and the further fact that it did not
appear that the state was setting up any claim to this
land, do afford evidence-whether sufficient or not it
was for the jury to determine-that the state had parted
with its title to the land, for certainly we would not be
justified in assuming that the state would collect taxes on
its own land. The judgment of this court is that the
judgment of the circuit court be affirmed. (Emphasis
added.) 48
Further, this point was considered in State v. Pacific
Guano Co.44 and State v. Pinckney,45 in both of which
title to marsh lands was expressly in question and it was considered by the court that, since marshlands were grantable, a
grant may be presumed to the same extent as for any other
grantable lands in the state. The authors invite particular
attention to State v. Pacific Guano Co. wherein the distinction
between the presumption of a grant on the one hand and adverse possession of the other, is set forth carefully and in
great detail.
Extensive and indeed exhaustive research has disclosed
neither statute nor decision which in any way limits or impinges upon the authority of the decisions above set forth and
the authors therefore feel that they can affirmatively assert
that a grant to marshland may be presumed, subject to the
caveat that a grant which gives tidal waters as its boundaries
is presumptively a grant only to high-water mark. Nevertheless, as is elaborately explained by Lord Hale and Mr. Angell,
a grant which on its face extends only to high-water mark
may be extended by proof of usage under such a grant
43. Id. at 318.
44. See note 6 supra.
45. Ibid.
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ADVERSE POSSESSION
Prior to 1870, there was no statute of limitations against
the state but in that year the legislature enacted what is now
Section 10-121 of the Code of 1952, which now reads as
follows:
The State will not sue any person for on in respect to
any real property or the issues or profits thereof by reason of the right or title of the State to the same unless:
(1) Such right or title shall have accrued within twenty
years before any action or other proceeding for the same
shall be commenced; or
(2) The State or those from whom it claims shall
have received the rents and profits of such real property
or of some part thereof within the space of twenty
years.

46

As originally enacted, the statute provided for a forty-year
limitation period which was reduced to twenty years in 1873.
Surprisingly enough it has never been construed.
In State v. Pacific Guano Co. and in State v. Pinckney, both
decided in 1884, the court cited this statute but pointed out
that twenty years had not then elapsed since enactment, so
that it was therefore inapplicable in those two cases. This
was again considered in Heyward v. Farmers'Mining
statute
Co.47 in which the court held that where the plaintiff's rights
accrued prior to 1870, they were covered by the forty-year
statute of limitation enacted in 1870 rather than by the
twenty-year statutory period specified in the amendment of
1873, because the amendment was inserted in an act which
expressly declared that its provisions should not extend to
causes where the right to action had accrued.
The only subsequent decision involving this statute was
Trustees of Univ. of S. C. v. City of Columbia,48 where the
court held that a municipal corporation, being a mere creature
of the legislature, is not entitled to plead adverse possession
against the state; however, the court seems to have assumed
that a private individual, under the circumstances shown to
exist in that case, would have acquired a good title by adverse
46. S.C. CODE §10-121 (1952).
47. See note 6 supra.

48. 108 S.C. 244, 93 S.E. 934 (1917).
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possession against the state. Be that as it may, the statute
certainly seems sufficiently unambiguous. And the only real
question that can seem open would be whether a claimant of
marshlands had exercised such acts of ownership over the
marsh as would be sufficient if he were claiming by adverse
possession against another private individual.
Our South Carolina statute was apparently lifted bodily
from the New York statute which was considered in People v.
Rector of Trinity Church,49 wherein the court held, among
other matters, that the state must prove affirmatively that
the land sued for had been taken within the statutory period.
The decision was cited to this point in the circuit decree in
State v. Pinckney, but the supreme court in State v. Pinckney
expressly reserved decision as to whether it would follow this
construction of the statute. Since, in order to prevail under a
plea of adverse possession, a party must prove that his possession has been continuous as well as adverse for the statutory period, this point seems to be of only academic interest
in South Carolina.
It is therefore the authors' view that a claimant to marshland, if sued by the state, is entitled to the benefit of Section
10-121, if, and only if, he can prove possession that has been
open, notorious, hostile, and continuous in himself or his ancestors for a full period of twenty years, and that the character of his possession must be the same as in air action between private parties.

49. 22 N.Y. 44 (1860).
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